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In the contemporary world the development of every country is
based not only on the utilization of domestic factors but also,
on a larger and larger scale, on external factors. The basic
prerequisites for their effective use are the openness of a
given economy and its competitiveness. In the present study
these problems are discussed, and information on the degree of
openness and competitiveness of the East European countries and
the former Soviet Union (for short EE countries) is given.
1. Definition of Openness and Competitiveness of a National
Economy
The problem of openness and competitiveness of a national eco-
nomy attracts at present the interest of many economists, Po-
lish economists among them. It is reflected in a number of va-
luable studies, whose authors aim at giving accurate definiti-
ons of such notions as openness of economy, competitive posi-
tion of a country, competitive capacities etc.
Economic openness has not been interpreted uniformly so far.
However, some generalizations can be made. First of all, it
goes without saying that economic openness is a category quite
See among others: Bossak [1984], Bienkowski [1987, 1988a and
b], Hakogi and Bienkowski [1981], Misala [1988].— 2 —
opposite to full economic autarky. Thus the open economy is one
that participates more or less actively in the international
exchange of products (goods and services) and factors of pro-
duction, i.e. capital, labour and the so-called dis-embodied
technology.
At present, it is difficult to speak, except purely theoreti-
cally, about a fully autarkic economy. Instead, we have to do
with different intensities in the growth of openness of indi-
vidual national economies, what is connected with the tendency
towards the internationalization of economic life and - first
of all - with the internationalization of goods' and production
factors' markets. It is usually accompanied by the internatio-
nalization of various institutions (banks, insurance companies
etc.) as well as the internalization of such externalities as
the pollution of natural environment or the consequences of the
so-called imitation effect of consumer patterns, motivations,
attitudes etc. These problems are, to a larger and larger ex-
tent, external not only for individual national economies and
various economic subjects (enterprises, consumers, etc.) acting
within their framework. Many of these problems can be already
described today as international problems of economic growth
(international externalities) [Lindbeck, 1975; Jones, 1985].
The openness of a national economy may be looked upon stati-
cally and dynamically. The latter approach deals with the pro-
cess of opening and closing the economy of one or more coun-
tries. The process of opening is understood in such a way that
in each period under scrutiny (e.g. every year) the country
receives more from outside (so-called input) in the form of
imports of products or factors of production, etc. and at the
same time it offers more and more to the other countries (so-
called output understood as export of goods, services, factors
of production and so-called externalities). Since the defined
above input of national economies is the output of others, it
may be stated that increasing openness is tantamount to the
process of internationalization and deepening-the international
interdependence in the field of production and exchange. Other-- 3 -
wise we have to do with closing.
Differentiation can be made between nominal and real openness
of the national economy of a given country. Nominal openness is
understood in terms of quantity only (e.g. share in world ex-
ports). This kind of openness means that possibilities for ma-
king profit exist when developing foreign flows of products and
factors of production according to basic principles of inter-
national turnover. In turn, real openness is the one that em-
braces additionally qualitative aspects of the active partici-
pation of a national economy in the international division of
labour.
The notion of real openness is closely connected with the no-
tion of competitive capacity understood as ability to fight and
to compete for profits resulting from the country's participa-
tion in the international division of labour [Bossak, 1984].
This profit-oriented fight existed already in the period of free
competition but it is also characteristic of the contemporary
world economy. The aim of the fight has remained unchanged. It
is only the way and conditions of the fight that change.
Competitive power understood as a long-term ability of econo-
mies to cope with international competition is sometimes re-
ferred to as factors' competitiveness. As opposed to this kind
of competitiveness, there is another notion, i.e. the so-called
resultative competitiveness, also called the competitive posi-
tion which in the countries of command economy referred mainly
to the participation of a given country or a group of countries
in the international exchange of goods and services.
There is no reliable measure or measures of real openness, es-
pecially in reference to state controlled economies. Thus, it
is extraordinarily difficult to measure precisely the competi-
1 See Fels [19 79], Zbytniewski [1986], and Bienkowski [1987,
1988a] .- 4 -
tive power of the EE countries which are striving nowadays more
or less to introduce principles of market economy. An accurate
analysis should quantify as precisely as possible such elements
influencing economic growth as the size and structure of
production factors, the effectiveness of their utilisation, the
efficiency of the socio-economic system, the efficiency of
economic policies of governments, etc. These are the most sig-
nificant factors that determine the flexibility of a national
economy, its ability to penetrate foreign markets and diffusion
of technological progress, its ability to accumulate capital as
well as its ability to influence the economies of other coun-
tries [Glismann and Horn, 1979; Fels, 1979; Bossak, 1984].
It is equally difficult to measure nominal openness or the so-
called resultative competitiveness or competitive position.
There are attempts, however, made in reference to earlier state
controlled economies, too. Firstly, it is useful to describe
the state of openness as a structural feature of a given eco-
nomy or a group of economies. Secondly, it is useful to analyze
the level of nominal openness whose results make it easier to
answer the question whether, in the dynamic approach, the pro-
cess of nominal openness is decreasing or increasing.
2. Results of Selected Empirical Analyses
In the whole post-war period the foreign trade of the EE coun-
tries has played an insignificant role in the world trade. In
terms of value it has been, as a rule, six or sevenfold smaller
than the foreign trade of the so-called developed capitalist
countries and about three, four times smaller than the foreign
trade of the developing countries. At the turn of the 1980's
and 1990's the divergence has clearly increased.- 5 -
Table 1 - Network of the World Trade in Selected Years after
World War II (in percentages)
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Source: UN [1989 and 1991].- 6 -
The place of the EE countries' foreign trade in the world trade
has so far by no means reflected their economic potential. It
has been, first of all, disproportionately small in comparison
with these countries' share in the world resources of manpower
and raw materials, global investment and production as well as
in the world income. The persistence of this state of affairs
was a direct consequence of the low and in the last several
years sharply decreasing level of openness and competitiveness
of their national economies.
2.1. Results of Selected Analyses of the Level of Openness
In the EE countries, there have been a number of studies car-
ried out concerning the level of openness of their national
economies. Analyses of this sort have also been carried out in
Poland where the most complex one was prepared in the middle of
the 1980s by D. Hiibner and W. Hiibner [1984]. The authors ana-
lysed the level of openness of Poland's economy against the
background of 23 countries, among them other EE countries, a
few highly developed countries and a few developing countries
called NIC's (newly industrialized countries). The study dealt
with the period of 1965-1980. It follows from the study that in
this period national economies of the EE countries belonged to
the group of the least open economies. The low level of open-
ness could be observed especially for Poland, Romania and, what
is partly understandable, the former Soviet Union.
According to the authors of the quoted study, Poland belonged
in that period, just as Romania and the former Soviet Union, to
the group of countries with a very low level of exports per
capita. In 1965, from all analyzed countries only five (Spain,
Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the former Soviet Union) ex-
ported less per capita than Poland; in 1980, the number fell
down to three (Greece, Yugoslavia,' and the Soviet Union). In
19 80, the volume of exports in Poland was only 10 per cent big-
ger than the world average. Then, the thesis was put forward- 7 -
that in the discussed period the capacity to adjust effectively
to changes in the world economy in Poland and many other EE
countries was lower than in the capitalist countries taken into
account.
This thesis is explained additionally by comparing exports per
capita to national income per capita in the analyzed countries.
Having applied this method, it appeared that the openness of
the EE countries in the analyzed period was relatively low and
kept declining. This was especially true in the case of Poland.
In this approach to the level of openness, only such countries
as the former Soviet Union, the USA, and Spain were less open
than Poland in 1980, the differences declining clearly to the
disadvantage of Poland.
D. Hiibner and W. Hiibner [19 84] also carried out a detailed ana-
lysis of foreign trade shares in the national income of the
countries in question. They came to the conclusion that the EE
countries were only weakly linked with the world economy. Jud-
ged from this kind of analysis, it appeared that Poland's nati-
onal economy distinguished itself to its own disadvantage. In
the analyzed period, the export share in the Polish GNP was on
average equal to one fourth or one third of equivalent shares
in other countries. Similar shares were found for Romania and
Bulgaria.
Many empirical analyses concerning foreign trade of the EE
countries suggest that the indices of demand and income elas-
ticity of imports or exports in these countries underwent a
considerable change in each of the post-war years. This phe-
nomen appeared especially clearly in the trade of the EE coun-
1 This thesis is also supported by results of many empirical
analyses based on the so-called mechanistic methods, espe-
cially on the matrix of international trade and on the so-
called gravity models. See among others: Cornelisse [1964],
Fink [1977], Kotynski [1979], Maciejewski [1981], Nagy and
Torok [1977], Nagy [1979], Ohlin [1981].- 8 -
tries with developed capitalist countries. Generally, as
claimed by D. and W. Hiibner [1984, p. 20], this resulted from
many reasons: "among others from the nature of management
system, domestic imbalance, low international competitiveness
of economy and instability of growth of the world economy".
These factors had also some impact in the 1980s, with different
intensity in the individual EE countries [Misala, 1988].
Table 2 - Shares of Selected Countries in World Trade, 19 78-









































































































































































































































Source: GUS [1990] and UN [1987]- 9 -
In the analyzed period 1978-1989, the level of openness of the
EE countries, measured by the share in world imports and ex-
ports, was still relatively low. With few exceptions, it became
even lower. Summing up, in case of most of the East European
countries, adjustment processes in reaction to changes in the
world economy were not satisfactory.
Table 3 - Value of the Foreign Trade Per Capita in Poland and






























































































































































Total Value of imports ,and exports divided by 2.- Imports
only.-
 c Data for 1984.- Data for 1987.-
 e Data for 1988.-
Source: GUS [1990].- 10 -
In terms of per capita foreign trade, the situation of Poland
was much worse than that of many other countries being com-
pared. For example, in 19 86 the value was 8 times smaller than
in the European Communities' [EC's] countries (excluding
Greece)/ almost 3 times smaller than in the EE countries (Po-
land including) and also definitely smaller (about 35 per cent)
than in Yugoslavia.
The rate of growth of foreign trade turnover per capita in Po-
land was on a relatively low level. Moreover, respective shares
of the countries analyzed in Table 3 declined in the period
1980-1988 only in the case of Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.
However, in case of Yugoslavia the decline amounted to 4.5 per
cent per capita, in case of Hungary 7.3 per cent per capita,
whereas the corresponding figure concerning Poland amounted to
as much as 28.9 per cent. As a result, in 1988 Poland was infe-
rior in terms of value of foreign turnover per capita to all
the EC countries (including Greece, Spain, and Portugal), all
other EE countries as well as Yugoslavia and South Korea.
2.2. Results of Selected Analyses of the Level of Competiti-
veness
Because of numerous, specific features of the functioning of
state controlled economies (e.g. detachment of internal prices
from the level and structure of the so-called world prices,
lack of real exchange rates), it was difficult to apply all
measures and indices of the level of competitiveness which are
applied in market economy countries. This fact has been stres-
sed among others in many studies on the subject prepared in
Poland [e.g. Bienkowski, 1988a, b] . Therefore, respective stu-
dies were usually carried out with various relatively simple
quantitative measures of competitive position [see Table 2].
These measures were used by W. Bienkowski [19-8,7, 1988b] in se-
veral works of him. He completed his considerations with re-- 11 -
suits of analyses made by experts of the Economic Commission
for Europe [ECE, 1987], Wharton Institute [Wharton, 1987] and
Vienna Institute for Comparative Studies [WIFO, 1985]. The re-
sults of W. Bienkowski's calculations based on the data publi-
shed by these Institutes are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 - Shares of the EE Countries' Exports in Imports of the OECD

























































































































































































"-" - no date.- Without USSR.- Considering trade between both former
German states.- No data for remaining years.
Source: WIFO [1985] quoted in Bienkowski [1987, p. 12].
If the share of exports' value of the EE countries in global
value of imports of the OECD countries is to be treated as one
of the measures of competitiveness, it appeared that in the
1970's and 1980's the EE countries' competitiveness- kept decli-
ning. The only exceptions in this respect almost throughout the
period 1970-1984 were Romania and the former Soviet Union. How-
ever, in 1984 the competitive position of these countries, too,
started to deteriorate considerably.- 12 -
The competitive position (resultative competitiveness) of the
EE countries measured by the share of their export value in the
imports of the OECD countries was different for individual
groups of commodities in the 1980s. Table 5 contains suitable
data enabling to put forward some reasons for the deterioration
of resultative competitiveness of the EE countries.
In the analyzed period the competitive position of the EE coun-
tries evolved in a similar direction. As appears from Table 5,
the share of these countries exports in the OECD countries'
imports of fuels, raw materials and foodstuffs slightly increa-
sed or remained unchanged, while at the same time the share of
the EE countries in the imports of the OECD countries clearly
declined in the case of machines and appliances as well as in-
dustrial consumer goods. Actually, the only dynamic group of
commodities were fuels, which was due mainly to the rapid in-
crease in their prices after the so-called second oil price
shock. In the period 1981-1986 only a few out of several dozen
groups of goods exported by the EE countries to the West achie-
ved higher shares in the imports of the OECD countries and as a
rule not substantially. They were all almost exclusively pro-
ducts of a low degree of processing. It appears from detailed
analysis prepared by Levcik and Stankovsky [WIFO, 19 85] that
out of 55 groups of commodities exported by the EE countries to
developed market economies in 1970-1983 only five were distin-
guished for their bigger share in imports of the OECD countries
in 1983 than in 19 70. Those were: crude oil and oil by-pro-
ducts, electricity, artifical fertilizers, wood, and wood pulp.
Among factors determining the position of the EE countries in
their common exports, the most significant have been undoubted-
ly economic factors so far, first of all the abundance of na-
tural resources and level of economic development. It may be
clearly seen, however, that a very important role was additio-
nally played by institutional factors, or to be more precise -
by the principles of functioning of' national economies of the
EE countries as well as foreign economic "policy instruments
employed. This is confirmed in Murrel's study [1981] of exportsBibliothek
des Insiituts fur Weitwirtschaff
- 13 -
Table 5 - Shares of the EE Countries' Exports in the OECD Countries Imports





Bulgaria machines and appliances 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05
fuels 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.20
basic raw materials 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.24
foodstuffs 0.19 0.16 0.26 0.20
industrial consumer goods 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03
Czechoslovakia machines and appliances 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.11
fuels 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.13
basic raw materials 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.51
foodstuffs 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
industrial consumer goods 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
GDR machines and appliances 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.15
fuels 0.26 0.45 0.49 0.50
Basic raw materials 0.77 1.06 1.07 1.08
foodstuffs 0.24 0.37 0.35 0.35
industrial consumer goods 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.14
Poland machines and appliances 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.11
fuels 0.18 0.34 0.36 0.36
basic raw materials 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.52
foodstuffs 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.31
industrial consumer goods 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04
Romania machines and appliances 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.09
fuels 0.43 0.55 0.58 0.58
basic raw materials 0.71 0.57 0.61 0.63
foodstuffs 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.10
industrial consumer goods 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05
Hungary machines and appliances 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
fuels 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.10
basic raw materials 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.58
foodstuffs 0.55 0.54 0.46 0.45
industrial consumer goods 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
EE-6 machines and appliances 0.73 0.73 0.54 0.56
fuels 1.26 1.91 1.90 1.87
basic raw materials 3.29 3.50 3.55 3.56
foodstuffs 1.43 1.55 1.56 1.52
industrial consumer goods 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.40
USSR machines and appliances 0.90 1.16 0.80 0.84
fuels 4.63 6.86 5.93 8.00
basic raw materials 1.76 1.72 1.66 1.65
foodstuffs 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.17
industrial consumer goods 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
EE-7 machines and appliances 1.63 1.89 1.34 1.40
fuels 5.89 8.77 7.83 9.87
basic raw materials 5.05 5.22 5.21 5.21
foodstuffs 1.56 1.74 1.73 1.69
industrial consumer goods 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.46
* - Data based on the first half of 1986. '
Source: Bienkowski [1988b, p. 12].- 14 -
from the East to the West as well as exports of some Western
countries (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Austria,
and Great Britain). Having analyzed revealed comparative ad-
vantage indices, Murrel stated that Hungary was in 1966-1975
the only country showing a similar efficiency in the process of
exports growth on Western markets as the Western countries men-
tioned above. What is more, in that period the effect of Hun-
garian export activities on Western markets indicated a rela-
tive improvement (approaching the positions of comparable West
European countries). Murrel attributed this, first of all, to
the stimulating influence of the economic reform started there
in 1968.
The analysis of Murrel was completed to some extent by Hanson
[1982], who estimated the effects of economic activities of
Poland, Hungary, and the former Soviet Union. The analysis con-
cerned the period 1971-1979, and its author paid special atten-
tion to the relations between the volume of imports of these
countries from the West and the volume of their exports to We-
stern markets of machines, appliances, and transport equipment.
According to Hanson, the effects of the so-called import-led
growth strategy applied by the analyzed EE countries were ex-
plicitly differentiated, definitely the best in the case of
Hungary and definitely the worse in the case of the other two
countries, especially the former Soviet Union. Summing up the
results of his analysis, Hanson [1982, p. 145] wrote: "First,
the import-export linkage may have been rendered less weak in
the Soviet than in the Polish case by the influence by national
economic size... Second, the element of "rush" in Polish policy
greatly exacerbated the subsequent balance of payments problem.
Both Soviet and Hungarian policies appear to have been better
in this respect. Third, Hungarian performance might be presen-
ted as the best of the three, insofar as the influence of na-
tional economic size should, in the case of Hungary, have been
especially disadvantageous".
The thesis of significant influence of the principal functio-
ning of national economies and foreign economic policy instru-- 15 -
ments of the EE countries on their export activities is also
confirmed by the results of empirical analyses aimed at the
estimation of effects of the creation of bilateral free trade
zones by these countries with Finland [Stankovsky, 1981; Kivi-
kari, 1983]. The authors of the analyses came to the conclusion
that the possibilities to increase their exports to Finland by
creating such zones were used by the EE countries in a limited
scope. In their opinion, only Hungary distinguished itself po-
sitively.
In the first half of the 1980s, a number of studies appeared
concerning the competitive position of the EE countries on
Western markets. Empirical analyses indicated clearly that the
structures of exports of the EE countries and developing coun-
tries to Western markets were similar and evolved to a great
extent in the same direction, with resultative compe itiveness
being definitely higher on the part of developing countries
(especially the so-called newly industrialized countries) than
the EE countries. These theses were confirmed by experts of
the UN Economic Commission for Europe who applied the method of
constant market shares. Table 6 contains a part of this analy-
sis .
Table 6 - Product [P] and Market [M] Patterns (combined) and
Performance Components [C] of the Ratio of Average
Annual Changes in Actual Exports and Exports Neces-
sary to Maintain a Constant Overall Share in the De-
veloped Western Economies' Market by Exporters in
1978-1981 (percentage points)





















Source: ECE [1983, pp. 517-519].
See among others: Lenel [1980], Winiecki [1982], Misala
[1985].- 16 -
Unfavourable results of the respective analysis for the EE
countries were different for each of them. It is confirmed by-
data in Table 7.
Table 7 - Product [7] and Market [M] Patters (combined) and
Performance Components [C] of the Ratio of Average
Annual Change in Actual Exports and Exports Necessary
to Maintain a Constant Overall Share in the Developed
Western Economies' Market for Individual EE countries































































































































































Source: ECE [1983, p. 517-518].-• 17 -
In 1988, a very interesting analysis concerning the competitive
position of the EE countries and five newly industrialized
countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and
Taiwan) on markets of the OECD countries between 1965 and 19 86
was presented by Kostrzewa [1988]. First of all, he divided all
the goods exported by these countries to the West into 5 groups
enumerated in Table 8.
Table 8 - Structure of the EE countries' and 5 Newly Industrialized Coun-
tries' Exports to the OECD Countries by Factor Intensities in












































































Source: Kostrzewa [1988, p. 22].
In spite of the increased EE countries' imports in the 1970s of
technology-intensive goods, a feature distinguishing their
It is a different question that these countries imported from
the West first of all middle and low technology-intensive
goods. As appears from empirical analysis made by Drabek
[1983], specific indices of "revealed technological advan-
tage" in imports from the West indicated a falling tendency
since the middle of 1980s. On the whole, he proved that the
degree of technological dependence of CMEA countries on the
West was in the 1980s relatively limited, and in the case of
technology-intensive products, it' actually declined gradu-
ally. It is well known that a certain role was then played by
Eastern countries abandoning gradually the so-called import-
led growth strategy.- 18 -
exports to the West, especially the respective export structure
of the former Soviet Union, was the high and generally increa-
sing significance of natural resource-intensive goods. In the
same period the share of resource-intensive products in exports
of the five newly industrialized countries to Western markets
declined considerably. On the other hand, in exports of these
countries the share of technology-intensive goods significantly
increased (including products difficult to imitate). Such a
development influenced naturally the shares of the analyzed
groups of countries in the global imports of the OECD countries
in the case of individual product groups.
Table 9 - Share of Imports from the EE countries' and 5 Newly Industri-
alized Countries' in Global Imports of the OECD Countries within












































































Source: Kostrzewa [1988, p. 25].
Quite contrasting changes in the shares of imports from the EE
countries and 5 NICs to OECD countries within the range of ana-
lyzed groups of commodities were confirmed by results of chan-
ges in the competitive position figured out by Kostrzewa by
means of the method put forward by Balassa. The next table con-
tains respective indices.- 19 -
Table 10 - Indices of Revealed Comparative Advantage [RCA] in Trade of the
EE countries and 5 Newly Industrialized Countries with OECD Mem-











































































Source: Kostrzewa [1988, p. 27].
In the analyzed period, the smaller EE countries differed
slightly from the former Soviet Union taking into account the
structure of resultative competitiveness of exports being di-
vided into groups of commodities with different factor inten-
sities. It was common for these countries, however, that they
did not succeed in improving their competitive position on
Western markets in the case of technology-intensive products,
which was in conflict with their abundance of production fac-
tors, especially with the statistical fact of possessing re-
latively abundant resources of highly qualified labour (the
so-called human capital).
In the same time, as Kostrzewa puts it [1988, p. 28] "almost
model-like were the changes in structure of the competitive
position of the analyzed group of Asian countries. It was true
for all considered groups of commodities. The changes measured
by differences in the value of revealed comparative advantage
indices were substantial. In 1986, these countries indicated a
definitely better competitiveness than in 19 65 for three groups- 20 -
of commodities, namely labour-intensive products, technology-
intensive products easy to imitate, and even technology-inten-
sive products difficult to imitate. Regardless of this, the
level of indices of revealed comparative advantage in the case
of natural resource-intensive and labour-intensive products
declined dramatically" . Such a development is explained by
Kostrzewa by differences in the system of functioning of na-
tional economies in the EE countries on the one hand and in the
Asian newly industrialized countries on the other. He goes on
claiming that the evolution of the respective indices in the EE
countries was closest to the evolution in Asian countries in
the case of the country with the most liberal system (Hungary),
the least close in the case of the country with the most cen-
tralised system of planning and managing the national economy
(USSR). According to Kostrzewa, Poland fell between Hungary and
the former GDR. Summing up his considerations he answers nega-
tively the question asked by himself whether East European
countries lose their ties with world market or not.
In Poland and Hungary, a thesis obvious today has been put for-
ward for many years, namely that a low level of openness of
centrally-planned economies as well as their growing difficul-
ties with the transformation of potential advantages, resulting
from the participation in the international division of labour,
2 into real advantages are system-specific. Referring to works
of Kalecki [1971] and Kornai [1979, 1980 and 1981], it has been
underlined many times that some of the most significant effects
of specific principles of functioning of the socialist socio-
economic system and permanent shortages of production capaci-
ties in relation to the still growing demand (the so-called
resource-constrained economies) are due to numerous deforma-
tions of the structure of the EE countries' economies, a low
See also: Heitger [1990] and Stehn, Schmieding [1990].
2
A comprehensive review of the literature may be found in the
study of Winiecki [1990]. See also the review of literature
in Misala [1987].- 21 -
level of their integration, a small propensity to invent and
innovate, a low quality of products, an underdevelopment of
after sales' services, a high and even increasing resource-
intensity of production and difficulties to maintain a balance
on the domestic market and in foreign trade.
In 1968, Wakar already wrote that foreign trade always reflect
the state of the whole national economy, and added that in case
of state controlled planned economies "foreign trade infection
resulting from drawbacks of internal economy" may be seen as a
rule especially clear [Wakar, 1968, p. 163]. Later on it was
mentioned many times that in the EE countries there appeared a
specific feedback between exports and imports which could be
presented as a closed cycle: low level of a pro-export specia-
lization of production - low export growth rate - balance of
payments difficulties - import substitution - low level of
pro-export specialization of production etc. It has also been
underlined many times that in the case of a shortage economy,
there exists a great uncertainty on the deliveries of semi-
finished goods, spare parts, etc. from domestic suppliers. As a
consequence, the majority of enterprises tend to become quasi
autark (so at the raicroeconomic level, too), which Winiecki
[1990] rightly described as "do-it-yourself bias".
It were J. Winiecki and E.D. Winiecki [1988] who made an in-
teresting analysis of competitiveness of the EE countries' ex-
ports of industrial goods to the EC countries. The analysis
comprised the 1965-1985 period and focused on unit (kilogram)
prices of engineering products obtained by the EE countries on
the EC market in comparison with average prices obtained by all
It is worth noting that the tendency of shortages and autarky
development on the macro- and micro-economic levels in state
controlled economies is to a large extent connected with the
fact that always planned objectives were correlated positive-
ly with the system of material and non-material incentives,
and at the same time there was only a loose connection be-
tween the system of incentives and the costs of production.- 22 -
exporters there. It was rightly assumed that
a) differences in kilogram (unit) prices inform about the scope
of value added realised for a given product on a given mar-
ket due to better quality or higher technological sophisti-
cation etc., and
b) differences in kilogram (unit) prices point to a different
product structure within a product group in terms of varying
shares of products with lower or higher value added.
Of course, the results of such an analysis are very useful for
estimating the competitiveness of individual countries and
groups of countries.
Table 11 - Unit (kilogram) Prices of Engineering Goods Obtained
by the EE Countries on the EC Market in 1965-1985

































































Relating to average prices obtained by all exporters there.-
Without intra-German trade.-
 c Weighted average.
Source: Winiecki E.D., Winiecki J. [1988, p. 10].- 23 -
In the 1965-1985 period prices obtained by the EE countries on
the EC market almost continously went down. Only in a few years
during the 1970s, these countries were able to stop or reverse
the fall in kilogram prices. This was, however, really a tran-
sient result of the catching-up strategy through technology
imports. Significantly, the differentials between average ki-
logram prices by all exporters on the EC market and those ob-
tained by the EE countries were greater in the case of more
sophisticated industries, even leaving aside engineering and
not taking into consideration the waste of resources in order
to maintain the appropriate share in the EC market.
Table 12 - Unit (kilogram) Prices of Various Manufactured Pro-
duct Groups Obtained by the EE Countries on the EC










































Relating to average prices obtained by all exporters there
Source: as in Table 11.
An attempt to analyze the level of price competitiveness of the
EE countries on the EC market was also made by Saunders [1986]
in a rather critical group of products - non-electrical machi-
nery. The purpose was to identify two elements in the competi-
tive position of these Eastern products on the market of the EC- 24 -
member countries:
a) by measuring the Western import market held by the EE coun-
tries in each product, and
b) by examining the characteristics of EC countries from the EE
countries, compared with those from other sources, in terms
of their relative unit values per ton.
Hence, when it was possible, relative values per appropriate
machine were additionally compared.
Based on such an analysis which was essentially static and li-
mited in scope, Saunders came to the conclusion that the temp-
ting hypotheses that the EE countries' export performance in
machinery is systematically linked with relative unit values -
either per ton or per machine - and that "lightness for money"
can be expected to bring about competitive advantage can derive
some, but not an overwhelming support from the presented evi-
dence. He added: "It is clear enough that Eastern machines are
heavier than competing machines in most of the categories ana-
lyzed and that in some categories better market shares are
achieved by products with higher relative unit values and,
presumably, the higher ratios of value added to raw material
content. Although the associations are weak, there may be im-
plications for Eastern production and planning techniques". At
the end of the paper he suggested to continue empirical studies
of this kind on a wider scale (combined with the studies of
technical characteristics of the products examined). It should
be highly appreciated that also such an approach could lead to
useful practical conclusions to reinforce openness and inter-
national competitiveness of the EE countries and to integrate
the economies of these countries into the world economy.- 25 -
3. Openness and Competitiveness at the Turn of 1980s and 1990s
At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, conditions of the EE coun-
tries' development and economic performance have changed con-
siderably. They affected also the level of openness and com-
petitiveness of their national economies.
3.1. New Conditions
New conditions of openness and competitiveness of the EE eco-
nomies are connected with deep political, systemic and economic
changes taking place in Eastern Europe since the beginning of
the 1989. They are characterized by the loss of authority by
political parties ruling in these countries so far, changes of
the system towards parliamentarian democracy and attempts to
create a market economy according to the example given by West
European countries. The changes take place especially in Po-
land, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia but to some extent also in
other EE countries. The situation in the former GDR has de-
veloped in a peculiar way. It has been united politically and
economically with the FRG.
The changes taking place in the former USSR and other countries
of Eastern Europe mean the disintegration of the command system
which was the basic reason for the shortages on the domestic
markets of these countries and for the numerous deformations of
the structures of their economies (e.g. underdevelopment of
services, neglect of agriculture), for high capital-, energy-,
and material-intensities of national income as well as for
difficulties to maintain the balance on domestic markets and in
the balance of payments. The ultimate task of governments in
the majority of the EE countries is the introduction of the
market mechanism (with state intervention of some sort). It
should help to improve the efficiency of the economies, to
bring desired structural changes and to transform the national
economies into economies with surplus of supply over demand- 26 -
(into the so-called demand-constrained economies). Such inten-
tions have been declared first of all by the first Polish non-
communist government which at the end of 19 89 presented Parlia-
ment a radical economic program and legislation enabling its
accomplishment [Balcerowicz, 1989].
The political changes and changes of the system taking place in
the EE countries had a great impact on the view concerning the
principles and methods of functioning of their integration or-
ganization, the more so that attempts to animate its activities
made for over twenty years as well as attempts to improve the
mechanism of co-operation and economic integration of former
socialist countries have failed. Representatives of the coun-
tries combining the Council expressed it quite clearly during
the 45th Session held in Sofia in 1990. The so-called Special
Committee was appointed then in order to prepare new rules and
measures favouring co-operation of the CMEA member countries.
At the end of 1990, these countries decided to dissolve the
CMEA and replace it with a new organization. The 46th Session
of the CMEA was planned to take place in Budapest on February
27-28, 1991, to put a formal end of the Council and to esta-
blish as its successor the Organization for International Eco-
nomic Cooperation. However, the Budapest session was cancelled.
On March 14-15, the permanent representatives of the CMEA mem-
ber countries met in Moscow for consultations and agreed that
this organizations will be definitely dissolved at the end of
August, 1991. They expressed their hopes that till that date
all the controversies over the division of the CMEA's property
will be cleared and that plans for a new consultative and in-
formative organization will be prepared.
The real collapse of the CMEA's principles, mechanisms and ac-
tivities came earlier. During the session held in Sofia in Ja-
nuary 1990 the Polish delegation proposed a gradual transition
to a market-oriented trade system with various mechanisms and
"shock-absorbers" protecting the mutual cooperation against the
impact of new regulations. But after the economic situation of
the former USSR worsened (growing shortages, balance of pay-- 27 -
ments' problems etc.) the Soviet government undertook a uni-
lateral decision to dismantle the traditional trade system and
to switch to a trade in convertible currencies and at world
market prices as soon as possible. On July 24, 1990, President
Gorbachev issued a decree "on introducing changes into the
Soviet Union's foreign economic relations" committing the
Soviet government to bring about a transition in economic re-
lations with other CMEA countries from January, 1991. As Rosati
[1991, p. 5] rightly underlines "this decision left little
choice for smaller CMEA members - they had to accept the reali-
ty. .. . Faced by the "fait accompli", the EE countries con-
cluded in the second half of 1990 bilateral agreements among
themselves, establishing the new institutional framework of
trade relations. The transferable rouble was to be replaced by
convertible currencies (mostly US dollars), artificial CMEA
prices by world market prices, and detailed annual protocols by
general agreements supplemented by "indicative" 'lists for se-
lected commodities". It is worthwhile to add in the meantime
the Gulf crisis broke out and the first trade effects of German
unification appeared [ECE, 1991].
3.2. New Problems
The new internal and external conditions are undoubtedly signi-
ficant objectives of the modifications of openness and compe-
titiveness of the EE countries, where the desire of active par-
ticipation in the international exchange of products and pro-
duction factors is explicitly underlined. From this point of
view the transition from a command system to the market economy
system with surplus of supply over demand is of great importan-
ce.
In the framework of the command system, the international eco-
nomic exchange played a passive roJLe, and therefore did not
help to increase the level of openness of the EE countries as
well as to increase their abilities to compete for advantages- 28 -
connected with the participation in the international division
of labour. With chronic shortages, the international exchange
of goods and services was treated as a residual and simulta-
neously as a buffer of some kind facilitating the adjustment of
the actual composition of national income to the structure of
production and consumption needs of the society. In these cir-
cumstances, imports were treated mainly as the sources of re-
ducing the shortages of investment and consumer goods. On the
other hand, exports were mainly undertaken in order to obtain
foreign currencies which were indispensable to finance imports.
As a rule they were confined to the sale of surplus natural
resources, to the sale of goods exceeding production and con-
sumption needs of society and often also to the sale of goods
in short supply, whose exports did not threaten much the
accomplishment of priorities of the central planners.
In the new system characterized by surplus of supply over de-
mand, the role of the international exchange is different.
There are different conditions and functions of imports and
exports. They can play active roles, with exports occupying the
first position as a source of additional demand and growth as
well as being the driving force of structural changes.
The experience of Western countries and many newly industria-
lized countries prove that it is mainly the case of surplus of
supply over demand on the domestic market that creates an im-
perative of some sort to participate actively in the interna-
tional division of labour and to maintain a high level of com-
petitiveness of the national economy. It sounds optimistic for
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia where after . checking the
"inflation of empty shelves" we have actually to do with a
surplus of supply over demand. But this is only one side of the
question. Putting it generally, checking inflation and
achieving a surplus of supply over demand do not mean at all to
produce automatically incentives to export-led growth, especi-
ally in the short run.- 29 -
The political changes in Eastern Europe at the turn of 1989-
1990, the start of the transition process to market-oriented
economic system in the majority of the EE countries, associated
in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia with stabilization pro-
grammes to reduce economic imbalances and to restructure na-
tional economies, were accompanied by a significant albeit
differentiated fall of output. Moreover, due to changes in the
mechanism of mutual economic cooperation, these countries lost
protection on their main markets (especially on the market of
the former GDR) and were forced to compete on markets of other
countries (the trade diversion effect). Additionally, due to
the rise of world energy prices associated with the Gulf
crisis, and due to the shift to convertible-currency settle-
ments and world market prices within the former CMEA, the terms
of trade of the EE countries clearly worsened (the terms of
trade effect) and this in turn increased in most of them (espe-
cially in the former Soviet Union) the shortage of foreign ex-
change (the foreign exchange shortage effect). Thus, the do-
mestic recession (the domestic contraction effect) came to-
gether with three other negative effects and just at a parti-
cularly inopportune time when the process of struggle with many
systemic and structural problems has begun [ECE, 1991; Rosati,
1991] .
The new internal and external situation of the EE countries in
1989 and, especially, in 1990 has led to the evident decrease
in the level of openness and competitiveness of their national
economies and it happened mainly due to the contraction of
their mutual trade. It is true that such a development meant to
some extent a positive adjustment; some output, which was in
fact system-specific waste, disappeared and, in addition, the
strong bias towards the former CMEA market was weakened, what
signified in reality the decline of the deficiencies in ex-
ternal sectors of the analyzed countries (e.g. inter-industry
rather than intra-industry specialization, distorted trade
structures, inconsistent with the pattern of comparative ad-
vantage). However, the negative short- and , medium-term con-
sequences were of greater importance although - as illustrated- 30 -
Table 13 - Trade Intensity Coefficients for the East European Countries
and the Soviet Union, 1980 and 1985-1990
































































































































































































































































a These coefficients relate the share of a market in "i" coun-
try's exports to the share of the same market in world exports,
according to the formula:
(/j)
x (•, j) : x (•,•)
where: x (i,j) - exports from country i to market j;
x (i,») - total exports of country i;
x (• rj ) - world exports to market j;
x (•/•) - total world exports.
Aggregation of rouble and non-rouble trade flows made at na-
tional cross-rates; EE 6 - East European countries without the
USSR but including the GDR; EE 5 - East European countries
without the USSR and GDR; DME - developed market economies, DEV
- all other countries.
Source: Rosati [1991, p. 41].
in Table 13 - the strong bias towards EE countries' markets was
weakened only to a small extent (in the case of Bulgarias'
trade with the former Soviet Union, this bias even increased),
it still existed the "radial" structure of their mutual trade
(stronger trade links with the Soviet Union than with other EE
countries), the unification of the two German states has left
the remaining small - and medium-sized EE countries with re-
latively weak mutual trade links, simultaneously they have lost
to a great extent a relatively important market of the former
GDR, and last but not least, the trade diversion from East to
West and to South was rather limited, in 1989 even negligible.
Qualitative aspects constituted in this context especially
troublesome problems. Firstly, the commodity pattern of the EE
countries' mutual trade didn't change substantially; the former
Soviet Union remained netto-exporter of natural resources and
raw materials while other countries have been netto-exporters
of processed industrial goods. Secondly, the output and export
pattern of the small and medium-sized EE countries remained- 32 -
similar. And thirdly, because of the change of the terms of
trade (increasing prices for natural resources and falling
prices for industrial products exported on the Russian market
by producers from Eastern Europe), the former Soviet Union
stood out as the single surplus country in the analyzed region,
while all other countries had a more or less balanced trade
between themselves and high deficits with the former Soviet
Union. It is worthwhile to add that all the EE countries faced
an acute need for a fundamental production and trade restruc-
turing, reached different stages of institutional reforms and
their mutual political credibility was rather weak [Rosati,
1991].
4. Future Options and Challenges
At present, one can only speculate what will happen in the
world economy and in the international division of labour in
the following years and decades. What we know is that mainly
due to systemic reasons the EE-countries have not participated
in the international division of labour in an optimal way, and
therefore, there exists economic potential to change the
situation. On the other hand, more active and intensive
participation of the EE countries in the international
exchange, can improve their economic performance and speed up
their economic growth. The main preconditions for closer
integration of these countries into the world economy are
systemic and structural changes.
History shows that every transition period is burdened with
enormous difficulties. The recent experiences of the
EE-countries confirm this; systemic reforms and structural
changes are very difficult to realize. However, on the other
hand, there are no viable alternatives. Quite sure, the most
successful countries in promoting' reforms and structural
adjustment can expect to perform better in the future than the
other countries.- 33 -
The degree of advancement of reforms and structural changes
within the EE-countries differs. While the "point of no return"
of the reforms in Bulgaria, Romania and especially in the
post-Soviet states has not yet been reached the direction and
determination of the reforms in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland are rather unquestioned. As it seems, just within these
countries the "critical mass" of systemic changes has been
overcrossed. However, it is hard to say over what period
troublesome endeavours of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland
will lead to greater openness and competitiveness of their na-
tional economies; there are some possibilities, but also many
challenges. Interesting enough is that all the necessary
changes request among others substantial liberalization of the
current account (goods and labour markets) and of the capital
account. Without these crucial steps, the unavoidable spee-
ding-up of the demonopolization and privatization processes are
hardly to imagine. Full liberalization of domestic markets and
a full currency convertibility are the next necessary ingredi-
ents. Without them, the real comparative advantages of national
economies will remain by and large unknown, while just esta-
blishing these advantages is clearly a starting point of the
reintegration into the world economy and of the necessary in-
crease in competitiveness.
The failure of Soviet-type development and industrialization
left Eastern Europe with very modest comparative advantages,
which today are difficult to define precisely even in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Nevertheless, some impor-
tant aspects and determinants are known. The EE-countries, es-
pecially some post-Soviet states possess first of all many va-
luable natural resources. But - as it seems - of greater im-
portance is these countries' stock of relatively cheap and
simultaneously relatively well qualified labour. That's why
after opening of the EE-countries' economies to foreign
portfolio and direct investment they may gain a significant
comparative advantage in mobile Schumpeter industries and this
in turn can result in high growth rates of production, exports
and incomes [Klodt, 1991]. In such circumstances, one can- 34 -
imagine a relatively quick change in the nowadays very heavy
demand conditions in Eastern Europe - very important deter-
minant for changes in competitive advantages [Porter, 1990].
The development of strong market segments with a high demand
for products, together with increasingly sophisticated buyers,
can greatly contribute to the improvement of the EE-countries'
international competitiveness [Czinkota, 1991].
Small- and medium-sized EE-countries and - especially - post
-Soviet states are suffering great deficiencies in their eco-
nomic infrastructure. However, relatively many efforts are
being gradually undertaken there to improve transportation and
communication systems, internal sets of hotels, banks etc.
Along with the processes of deregulation, demonopolization and
privatization, the interlinking between branches, industries
and firms are increasing. One can also observe steadily growing
domestic competition and formation of new corporate conditions.
A growing number of people try out their entrepreneurial skills
or wish to do it in the near future. Without doubt, these
phenomena would be even more visible in better, more liberal
internal and external environment.
There are many external challenges which will determine the
future level of openness and competitiveness of the EE-coun-
tries and - quite funny - the most important ones are directly
connected with their mutual cooperation. On the one hand, as
pointed out earlier, these countries' economies are heavily
interdependent and the weakening of these dependencies is
rather a long-term process; on the other hand, mainly due to
many structural problems, the reestablishment and, especially,
the remarkable intensification of mutual economic links are
hardly feasible and manageable. First of all, the future
situation within the former Soviet Union with its various
political and economic difficulties is. still rather unpre-
dictable. Second, the small and medium-sized EE-countries are
generally not ready to engage in rebuilding asymmetrical and
inefficient integration structures with elements of planning,
programming etc. Third, because of the structural tendency to- 35 -
unbalanced trade between the former USSA and other EE-coun-
tries, the relatively low intensity and big similarity of
structures of their mutual trade, the acute need for funda-
mental production and trade restructuring, the different stages
of institutional reforms, and the lack of political credibility
the rapid establishment of market-oriented instruments (e.g.
full convertible currencies) and mechanisms (e.g. customs or
payments union) is quite clearly difficult, almost impossible
[Paszynski, 1991; Rosati, 1991].
In order to promote trade and other forms of economic coopera-
tion between the EE-countries, the idea of "integration in
triangles" has been advanced, where the creation of free trade
area between Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland has been
treated as the most likely and feasible one [Bozyk, 1988]. But,
as M. Paszynski [1991, p. 7] rightly stated "Whatever economic
advantages of such smaller-scale integration, two factors
appear to stand in the way of its successful achievement. One
is strictly economic and results from similarity of production
structures, an outcome of the communist economic system imposed
in the past, with its stress on the expansion of less techno-
logically advanced heavy industries, producing basic material-
and energy-intensive commodities and machinery. Second is po-
litical, and stems from the lack of mutual confidence deeply
rooted in harsh competition that was characteristic for the
CMEA system, with the first factor strengthening the second.
. . . The inadequacy of mutual trust could not be easily over-
come." One has to add that the future of political and economic
relations between the Czech and Slovak republics is still an
open question [Capek, 1991] and that even the smaller-scale
regional integration would require larger involvement of West
European countries [Jenszenszky, 1990].
The other possibility of small-scale regional economic inte-
gration is the creation of a free trade area or customs union
between Poland and the three Baltic,republics. However, due to
the political and economic reasons (e.g. actual political ten-
sions between Poland and Lithuania, marginal role of Baltic- 36 -
republics in Polish foreign trade, tendencies in Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia to integrate themselves with other post-
Soviet states and with Scandinavian countries), prospects for
the establishment of such an integrational grouping are rather
gloomy. Because of the same reasons, even more gloomy are the
prospects of small-scale regional integration between Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ukrainia, Byelorussa or Kazakhstan.
This does not mean, however, that the economic cooperation be-
tween these countries should not or will not develop in the
future. Quite contrary. The same is true for the EE-countries'
economic relations with developing countries. However, due to
several geographical (distance, transport costs), historical
(late coming to the post-colonial markets being already pene-
trated by former metropolises), structural (inter-industry
rather than intra-industry specialization) and systemic reasons
(antitrade bias) these countries can hardly compete with West
European ones [Paszynski, 1991].
Bearing in mind the EC-EFTA talks for the creation of the Eu-
ropean Economic Area, Kostizewa and Schmieding [1989] have
suggested to find via EFTA a better chance for an easier access
to the Communities' market. It was not and even could not be
the right solution. Firstly, due to many structural and techno-
logical reasons an economic gravitation of the EE-countries
towards EC was clear and actually is increasing. Secondly,
there was obvious trend within EFTA countries to accede to the
European Community directly, with some, like Austria and Swe-
den, lodging formal application, and others, like Finland,
openly declaring their to do so, and in such circumstances
entering into agreement on free trade area with EFTA could lose
its potential importance. Thirdly, one could hardly expect that
EFTA will concentrate its attention on talks with Central and
Eastern European countries to conclude them before agreement
with the Community is reached. It was the real case; in October
22, 1991 EFTA countries concluded the European Economic Area
agreement with the Communities. Thus the EC and EFTA created
the world's largest and most integrated market, made up of 19
countries with a total of 380 million inhabitants, in which- 37 -
goods, services, persons and capital will be able to move
freely. Quite sure, cooperation in a large number of flanking
policies will be intensified.
The conclusion of the European Economic Area gave a very po-
sitive signal to the EE countries but they will not be able to
benefit from its advantages immediately. The second best so-
lution is to continue negotiations with EFTA on the establish-
ment of free trade areas as it is the case of Czechoslovakia,
Poland and Hungary. But the first one is to improve institu-
tional framework for a wider European economic integration via
European Communities which provide the only realistically
available set of institutional arrangements to manage the in-
tegration of the European economies and thus to promote also
openness and competitiveness of the national economies of the
EE countries [CEPR, 1990].
Table 14 - Share of the EFTA and EC Member Countries in the
Global Exports of the East European Countries and
the Soviet Union in 1980 and 1990. [%]
Specification EFTA countries EC countries










In 19 91 EFTA has also taken up 'relations with the three
Baltic states and started a dialogue with- ,Bulgaria and Ro-
mania .- 38 -
At the turn of the 1980's and 1990's some of the EE countries,
namely Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, started to exploit
the most promising alternative of not being economically
isolated. They have engaged in negotiations with the EC's
Commission in order to conclude association agreements, which
were treated there as.a specific vehicle to full membership in
the EC. It was assumed among others that the association with
the European Communities will really promote openness and com-
petitiveness of the national economies of Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland. There were chances. First of all, an
association of these countries with the EC could alleviate the
difficult process of systemic transformation and simultaneously
of adjustment to the present EC requirements. That was treated
as very important since the transformation into market econo-
mies calls not only for the changes in the political and eco-
nomic systems and their legal frameworks, but also for the
establishment of the material and institutional infrastructure
to secure smooth involvements into and interactions with the
world economy. Second, conclusions of association agreements
with provisions regarding the liberalization of trade and of
migration of production factors would mean automatically more
competition and more trade in accordance with the basic prin-
ciple of international exchange - the principle of comparative
costs. What is more, according to the theory and practice of
economic integration, the trade creation effects is usually
accompanied by the so-called dynamic effects (increase in
welfare and demand due to scale economies, speeding-up of the
technological progress etc). Last but not least, the conclusion
of association agreements could increase the external credi-
bility of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and the internal
credibility of their governments realizing the transformation
processes (growing confidence of people that liberalization,
growing openness, belonging to Europe etc. are the right ways
to improve growth and welfare), and . simultaneously these
governments could be in a position to use EC's institutions and
regulations as a specific umbrella 'where promoting liberaliza-
tion of domestic markets and external sectors and coping with
the still present tendencies to economic autarky and isolation- 39 -
(the argument of "binded hands"). This argument is really very
important since protectionist tendencies are there still very
strong. No wonder. Coping with protectionism is always a hard
task. After many years of communist political and economic
autarky and isolation this task is especially difficult to
achieve.
According to the assumptions it was not only the process of
building market oriented economies in Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland and the process of adjustment to the present EC re-
quirements what the association agreements could and should
smoothen and speed-up. There was a third, very important task
of the EE countries' association with the EC, which should make
these agreements clearly unique ones. They could and should
simultaneously smoothen and speed up the adjustment process of
the EE countries to the future EC requirements. More precisely,
to the "Europe 1992" challenge, which seems to be especially
painfully for them. First of all, exporters from the EE coun-
tries will confront much stronger competition on the Communi-
ties' internal market. Second, economic units from these coun-
tries have nowadays only to a small extent been adjusted to the
structural, technological and organizational realities of the
EC after 1992. Third, possibilities of the EE countries to
overcome expected difficulties in the trade with EC and EFTA
members through the expansion of technology and capital are
very limited. However, on the other hand, the creation of the
larger Single Market and of the European Economic Area will
bring many opportunities to intensify economic relations with
the West European countries (e.g. possibilities of the exploi-
tation of the economies of scale and of the increased demand).
The same seems to be true taking into account long-term con-
sequences of the economic integration of Germany [Misala,
1991].
The EC countries, especially Germany, were and are still moti-
vated to support the political and economic transformation in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and other EE countries. Many
statements and concrete actions in favour of stabilisation,- 40 -
adjustment and systemic reform policies confirmed it (e.g.
substantial economic assistance, promotion of direct invest-
ments in Eastern Europe, abolition of the various discrimina-
tory measures). However, on the other hand, the EE countries'
efforts to establish market economies with increasing economic
ties to the West, especially to the EC, were cyclically fru-
strated, encouraged and then dashed again (e.g. French veto in
September, 19 91 to the EC Commission's proposal to grant trade
concessions to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland). The some-
what ambivalent EC countries' and EC Commission's attitude
towards these countries revealed also contents of the associ-
ation agreements of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland with the
EC concluded in December, 1991.
Association agreements of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland
with the EC are surely of great political importance for these
countries. On the one hand, these rather unique agreements
establish an appropriate framework for the political dialogue,
for the promotion of the economic and cultural relations, for
the promotion of the Communities' financial and technical
assistance to associate countries and thus also for their gra-
dual integration into the Communities, and on the other, the
present and future governments of these countries are committed
in many respects (e.g. the successive reduction of trade bar-
riers, the granting for the establishment of Communities' com-
panies and nationals a treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to associated countries' nationals and companies in
accordance with the agreed timetable). For the countries
characterized by strong internal resistance to the liberali-
zation of external sectors and by still big political insta-
bility (e.g. many political parties in the Parliament of Po-
land, political tensions between Czechs and Slovaks) these
commitments can be created as factors of stabilization and
vehicles to increase internal and external credibility. Of
course, the commitments is to fullfil in an appropriate way and
it is one of the most important challenges for the future.
Many others are connected with the real scope of established- 41 -
institutional framework for a wider economic cooperation and
therefore also for the promotion of the transformation pro-
cesses and of the openness and competitiveness of the national
economies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Having in mind
what was expected and is really needed in these countries one
has to see some important discrepancies. Firstly, the essence
of the discussed association agreements is almost limited to
the creation of the free trade areas; as it seems, even if
these areas will be created in the next ten years Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and Poland will not be in a position to benefit
fully from advantages of the Single European Market and addi-
tionally from advantages of the European Economic Area and
therefore the adjustment process of their economics to the
present and future requirements of West European countries is
to be treated as a harder one than in a more advantageous
circumstances; Secondly, what leads to the same conclusion, it
goes only about the creation of the limited free trade areas in
this sense that: a) many agricultural products are excluded
from the liberalization process or treated in a specific manner
and b) even turnover with some for associated countries impor-
tant products (like textiles, coal and steel products) is to be
liberalized with great delay and under specific conditions.
Thirdly, the association agreements contain a lot of escape
clauses, especially in case of trade with agricultural pro-
ducts. Therefore, it is hardly to believe that the expected
trade creation effects will be substantial and that the so-
called dynamic effects of economic integration will speed-up
remarkably the growth rates of national economies of
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and will help dramatically
to increase their openness and competitiveness. Moreover, such
a state of affairs is to some extend harmful if we take into
account that it means relative increase (in comparison with the
expected and possible solutions) in the difficulties that
accompany the processes of transformation and structural chan-
ges and relative increase in social discontent brought by these
difficulties. What seems also important, is that such a state
of affairs mean underutilization of the "binded hands" argument
and even give new arguments for advocates of protectionism ope-- 42 -
rating also with the slogans "EC discriminate too", "EC don't
want to bind clearly and definitely own hands too" or "Europe
doesn't want us." More realism was and is still needed. Quite
sure, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the other EE coun-
tries need cooperation with the EC in order to realize systemic
and structural changes, to open their economies more, to in-
crease the level of competitiveness, to dampen social dissatis-
faction stemming from many hardships in the transition period
and to avoid possible negative political implications. But the
EC member countries need also the cooperation with more open,
more competitive and more stabilized Eastern Europe. As M.
Czinkota [1991, p. 26] puts it rightly "it must be understood
that instability does not just result from tanks, but also from
the knowledge that the next-door neighbour lives in poverty-
driven volatility."
CONCLUSIONS
In the contemporary world the tendency to internationalization
of economic life is being clearly exposed and that is why the
EE countries' joining the international division of labour is
an imperative. It must not only be an active participation in
the international exchange of goods and services but also an
active participation in the international exchange of produc-
tion factors. It is tantamount with the necessity to start the
process of the so-called real openness of national economies
understood as increasing ability to compete for the advantages
connected with active participation in the international di-
vision of labour. The real openness of national economy
(described also as factors' competitiveness) is nothing but its
ability and disposition (people's skills too) to transform
potential advantages resulting from the participation in the
international division of labour into real ones.
A clear difference should be made between factors' competi-
tiveness and the so-called resultative competitiveness (called- 43 -
sometimes also the competitive position). The so-called re-
sultative competitiveness (similarly as a matter of fact to
factors' competitiveness) is still a category difficult to
measure. It is especially difficult to measure the level of the
so-called factors' competitiveness in state controlled eco-
nomies .
The results of the empirical analyses presented above testify
with no doubt that in the 1970s and 1980s the level of openness
of individual EE countries was definitely lower than their
share in world resources and production. It proves that in the
economic development of these countries external factors were
not utilized proportionately to their economic potential.
Many factors hinder a greater openness of the EE countries'
economies of which the most significant one was the decline in
the level of their competitive abilities being reflected by lew
and usually decreasing tendency of indices of the so-called
resultative competitiveness (competitive position). It was a
direct consequence of the distorted structures of exports and
insufficient elasticity in adjusting the structure of internal
production to the structure of domestic and external demand.
The reasons for this state of affairs were much deeper. Ge-
nerally, they were typical drawbacks of the so-called re-
source-constrained economies. The effects of these drawbacks
appeared in all EE countries, though with different intensity.
As a consequence, economies of these countries were charac-
terized till the end of the 1980s by explicitly limited
abilities to transform potential advantages, resulting from the
participation in the international division of labour, into
real ones.
At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the conditions of the EE
countries' development and economic performance have changed
considerably. Some of them, mainly Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland, shifted clearly from centrally planned to market-
oriented economies with surplus of supply over demand. However,
even in these countries it was not possible to increase the- 44 -
level of openness and competitiveness of the national eco-
nomies. It was due to mainly the fall of internal demand which
accompanied the start of the transition process to market-
oriented economic systems, and the collapse of intra-CMEA
trade.
Prospects for the necessary increase in the level of openness
and competitiveness of the EE countries by the re-establishment
and intensification of their mutual links are rather gloomy.
There exist many political, institutional and structural
obstacles which will hamper mutual economic cooperation of
these countries throughout many years. An even further decline
in the intensity of intra-East European trade and other forms
of economic cooperation is highly probable, if not unavoidable,
unless market mechanisms are not fully adopted, and all the
necessary external support delivered (trading, funding, in-
vestments, technology transfer etc.).
In order to increase the level of openness and competitiveness
of the EE countries and to speed up transition processes in
Eastern Europe, there exists no other alternative for the coun-
tries of this region than to develop closer economic relations
with the European Communities. Of special importance seems to
be the fullfilment of association agreements' provisions and
then joining the EC. These unique agreements can smoothen the
processes of building market economies, as well as smoothen the
processes of necessary adjustments. However, too much optimism
seems to be unjustified. What matters are the many discrepan-
cies between basic needs and expectations in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland - on the one hand, and the established in-
stitutional framework of economic cooperation - on the other.
External support seems to be necessary in order to increase the
level of openness and competitiveness of Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary Poland and other EE countries. However, more important is
the autonomous liberalization of internal markets and external
sectors of these countries. When liberalising the current
account (goods and labour markets) and the capital account- 45 -
(financial markets) one has to look to the liberalization in
the main economic partners and their groupings.- 46 -
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